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Abstract1
European banking sectors have been subject to various forms of deregulation, liberalization,
as well as dramatic improvements in information technology (IT). As the result of the creation of
the European UnionÕs Single Market, the financial institutions are transforming themselves in
response to fundamental changes in regulation and technology. Many of these changes have vast
implications for competition, concentration and the efficiency of the financial sectors. This paper
examines the impact of increasing concentration and new technologies, linked with the mergers
and acquisitions (M&A) process, on the degree of competition and technical efficiency of the Polish
commercial banks. The goal of this paper is to check whether, during the analyzed period (1997-
2002), the concentration of the commercial banks had a negative impact on the competition in the
Polish banking sector. In order to carry out a quantitative assessment of changes in the market
structure and technical efficiency of the Polish banking sector, the study estimates competitive
behavior in the Polish banking system by applying the method developed by Panzar and Rosse
(1987). Moreover, this study assesses the technical efficiency and productivity in the Polish banking
sector by applying the method of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).
The empirical results, for the analyzed period of 1997-2002, have shown that in Poland there
is monopolistic competition. It seems that foreign entry, connected with the M&A process, and
rapid changes in IT in Polish commercial banks, is one of the reasons for the improving technical
efficiency measures and productivity indices. It has also influenced the level of competition in the
Polish banking sector.
JEL Classification: F36; G2; G21; G34; L1.
Keywords: Competition; Concentration; Efficiency; Panzar-Rosse model; DEA; Mergers and
Acquisitions; Market Structure.
1 The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent those of the NBP. An earlier version of this paper was
presented at 25th SUERF Colloquium in Co-operation with the Bank of Spain ÒCompetition and Profitability in European
Financial Services: Strategic, Systemic and Policy IssuesÓ (Madrid, October 2004).6
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Introduction
In the current era, market structure and competition in the European financial system are
major economic policy issues. The degree of competition in the financial sector may influence the
efficiency of the production of the financial services. Relationships between competition, banking
system performance, efficiency, and stability have been extensively analyzed in theoretical literature
as well as in empirical research. In general, in a competitive environment, only the most efficient
and innovative firms survive. However, for the financial sector there might be instances in which
competition may have a negative impact on stability, as the least efficient firms may have an
incentive to increase their risk exposure in order to reach the industry profitability level. If these firms
are large enough, the financial stability of the firms may be may be threatened2.
Banking competition is a crucial issue for the new members of the EU. The most important
change in the business environment of the Polish banking sector, after joining the EU, is the
possibility of new banks entering using a Òsingle banking licenseÓ3. The most important change for
clients using banking services, should be to lower transaction costs and to have better access to
lending in the Single Banking Market. However, accession to the EU also creates additional
challenges for PolandÕs banking industry. The solutions and likely ways to survive in a competitive
environment for domestic financial institutions in the EU, are the improvement of their efficiency
and competitiveness by mergers and acquisitions (which will contribute to a reduction of operating
costs), further development of products for households and small and medium sized businesses,
outsourcing, and engagement in the servicing of niche markets. Those processes are supported by
new technologies as well as by the Internet.
A number of analysts, who have investigated the trade-off between competition and
concentration, have found that there is no evidence that the banking sector concentration relates
negatively to competition (Claessens and Laeven (2003), Gelos and Roldos (2002), Hempell (2001)).
This paper examines the impact of the increasing concentration and new technologies, linked
with the M&A process, on the degree of competition and technical efficiency of Polish commercial
banks in the period of 1997-2002. In order to carry out a quantitative assessment of the changes
in the degree of competition, market structure and technical efficiency of the Polish banking sector,
this study has been structured into two investigations:
Firstly, it estimates the competitive behavior in the Polish banking system, by applying the
non-structural P Pa an nz za ar r   a an nd d   R Ro os ss se e approach (1987), based on panel data for Polish commercial banks for
the period of 1997-2002. The above methodology enables to identify the nature of the market
structure, i.e. monopoly or perfectly collusive oligopoly, monopolistic competition and perfect
competition, by applying the elasticity of total interest revenues function with respect to changes in the
banksÕ input prices, called the H H- -s st ta at ti is st ti ic c. .
Secondly, based also on the above mentioned panel data, this study estimates the
technical efficiency, the scale efficiency and the productivity changes in the Polish banking sector,
by applying the D Da at ta a   E En nv ve el lo op pm me en nt t   A An na al ly ys si is s (DEA). Additionally, by applying the DEA method, the
paper also examines the impact of M&A on the technical efficiency and the productivity of Polish
commercial banks in the period of 1997-2002. This investigation tries to check whether M&A
2 See Group of Ten Report on consolidation in the financial sector (January 2001), which can be obtained through the
websites of the BIS, the IMF and the OECD: www.bis.org, www.imf.org, www.oecd.org, p. 267.
3 Banks that are licensed in any EU country have the right to open new branches and conduct operations in any other
Member State without submitting to licensing procedures. That way the Polish banks are subjected to stiffer competitive
pressure: domestic banks have higher levels of general expense than banks in the EU countries. New branches of foreign
banks may enjoy a competitive edge over the domestic banks due to lower costs (resulting from the use of their parent
bankÕs IT systems, for example), see: Financial Stability Report, June 2001-December 2002, NBP, p. 23.Introduction
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increased the efficiency and productivity of these banks. Productivity growth has been analyzed via
the Malmquist productivity index (M).
Based on the micro-data of the banksÕ balance sheets and profit and loss accounts for the
years 1997-2002, monopolistic competition has been found (as confirmed by the fact that the
values of the H statistic lay clearly between zero and one). However, despite the decrease in the
number of banks in Poland during the investigated period and a slight increase in concentration
during that time, there have been no indications of lower competition at the end of the analyzed
period. Moreover, a slight increase in efficiency and productivity has been observed in the Polish
banking sector between 1997-2002.8
1
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Changes in the structure of the banking system in Poland
Due to the increase in M&A during the period (1997-2002) there was a significant reduction
in the number of Polish commercial banks. The number of commercial banks fell from 83 at the
end of 1997, to 62 at the end of 2002. Moreover, the M&A process was strictly connected to the
process of privatization, based mostly on foreign capital. The M&A taking place in 1997-2002 were
a natural consequence of privatization and foreign investments in the Polish banking sector, and
were influenced by international consolidation of foreign shareholders-parent banks of Polish
subsidiaries4.
Foreign capital penetration in Polish commercial banks rose from 15% at the end of 1997, to
67% at the end of 2002. There were 47 banks with majority foreign equity at the end of December
2002. By contrast, there were only 29 at the end of December 1997. 
In the period 1997-2002, consolidation processes resulted in an increase in the concentration
of the banking sector as measured by concentration indices: Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI)5 and CR5,
CR10, CR15
6. The development of these indicators also clearly demonstrates an increasing
concentration level in the Polish banking sector. At the end of 2002, the market share of the five
largest banks accounted for 56% of assets and more than 56% of deposits (see Table 1).
A deterioration of all profitability ratios in 1998 with comparison to 1997 was the
consequence of the banking crisis in Russia. Moreover, a significant slow-down in economic growth
in Poland in 2000, followed by lower creditworthiness of businesses, has also resulted in a decrease
Table 1 Polish Banking SectorÕs Concentration Level Ð 1997-2002 (%)
H He er rf fiin nd da ah hll- -H Hiir rs sc ch hm ma an n   I In nd diic ce es s   ( (H HH HI I) ) 1 19 99 97 7 1 19 99 98 8 1 19 99 99 9 2 20 00 00 0 2 20 00 01 1 2 20 00 02 2
F Fo or r   llo oa an ns s 0.051 0.045 0.066 0.061 0.076 0.077
F Fo or r   a as ss se et ts s 0.074 0.067 0.079 0.076 0.089 0.087
F Fo or r   d de ep po os siit ts s 0.088 0.077 0.082 0.080 0.094 0.093
5 5   L La ar rg ge es st t   B Ba an nk ks s   ( (C CR R5 5) ) 1 19 99 97 7 1 19 99 98 8 1 19 99 99 9 2 20 00 00 0 2 20 00 01 1 2 20 00 02 2
F Fo or r   llo oa an ns s 40.37 36.07 43.01 43.71 53.95 53.43
F Fo or r   a as ss se et ts s    48.08 44.60 49.58 48.32 57.10 56.17
F Fo or r   d de ep po os siit ts s 51.53 47.40 49.72 49.14 57.80 56.89
1 10 0   L La ar rg ge es st t   B Ba an nk ks s   ( (C CR R1 10 0) ) 1 19 99 97 7 1 19 99 98 8 1 19 99 99 9 2 20 00 00 0 2 20 00 01 1 2 20 00 02 2
F Fo or r   llo oa an ns s 60.71 56.83 65.09 63.99 77.30 77.31
F Fo or r   a as ss se et ts s 68.41 64.78 70.43 69.35 80.92 80.44 
F Fo or r   d de ep po os siit ts s 69.94 66.80 70.84 70.01 62.20 81.39 
1 15 5   L La ar rg ge es st t   B Ba an nk ks s   ( (C CR R1 15 5) ) 1 19 99 97 7 1 19 99 98 8 1 19 99 99 9 2 20 00 00 0 2 20 00 01 1 2 20 00 02 2
F Fo or r   llo oa an ns s 74.19 72.06 78.06 78.22 83.15 84.13
F Fo or r   a as ss se et ts s 80.39 78.07 82.17 81.94 86.02 86.68
F Fo or r   d de ep po os siit ts s 81.14 79.01 83.33 83.23 86.96 87.31
4 E.g. the merger of Powszechny Bank Kredytowy SA with Bank Przemys¸owo Handlowy SA as a result of the merger of
thier shareholders - Bank Austria Creditanstalt and HypoVereinsbank, resulting in the creation of the third largest bank
in Poland.
5 HHI is calculated as the sum of squared market shares of each firm in a market in the terms of assets, deposits, and
loans. Herfindahl-Hirschman indices in the range below 0.1 show a very low concentration, in the range 0.11 - 0.18
show a moderate concentration, in the range above 0.18 show a very high concentration of the banking system,
whereas the index value equal to 1 shows a full concentration.
6 These indices are calculated as market share of the five, ten and the fifteen largest banks.
Source: own analysis.1
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in profitability in the Polish banking sector. This was reflected in a deterioration at the end of 2002
(compared to 2000) of the following ratios: gross profitability was 4.0%, net profitability was 2.4%,
return on assets (ROA) was 0.5%, return on equity (ROE) was 5.2% (see Table 2). The decrease in
net interest margin (NIM) to 3.3% in 2002 was a result of the decrease in net interest income and
an increase in competition.
However, during the 1997-2002 period, the Polish banking sector was undergoing intense
transformation and development. The modernization of distribution channels and the
implementation of new technologies have increased the availability of services and the effectiveness
of banksÕ operation.
Table 2 Commercial Banking SectorÕs Efficiency Indicators Ð Poland 1997-2002 (%)
E Ef ff fiic ciie en nc cy y   R Ra at tiio os s    1 19 99 97 7 1 19 99 98 8 1 19 99 99 9 2 20 00 00 0 2 20 00 01 1 2 20 00 02 2
P Pr ro of fiit t   b be ef fo or re e   t ta ax x   o ov ve er r   a av ve er ra ag ge e   a as ss se et ts s   ( (R RO OA A) )   ( (% %) ) 2.1 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.0 0.5
P Pr ro of fiit t   b be ef fo or re e   t ta ax x   o ov ve er r   t tiie er r   1 1   e eq qu uiit ty y   ( (R RO OE E) )   ( (% %) ) 37.2 9.2 12.9 14.5 12.7 5.2 
N Ne et t   iin nt te er re es st t   m ma ar rg giin n   ( (N NI IM M) )1 ( (% %) ) 5.2 4.6 4.1 4.3 3.4 3.3 
N No on n- -p pe er rf fo or rm miin ng g   llo oa an ns s   ( (N NP PL L) )2 ( (% %) ) 10.8 10.9 13.2 14.9 17.8 21.2
Note:
1 Net interest margin (NIM) = net interest income (interest income minus interest expenses) over average assets.
2 The share of loans in assets which are classified as: substandard, doubtful and loss.
Source: NBP.10
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Competition in the Polish banking industry in 1997-2002
M Me ea as su ur ri in ng g   b ba an nk k   c co om mp pe et ti it ti io on n
This study estimates competitive behavior in the Polish banking sector by investigating the
degree of competition. There are two major schools of thought in the methodology of assessing
competition among banks: the structural approach and the non-structural approach. The
structural approach is based on the more conventional views of the relation between
competition and market structure, and embraces the s st tr ru uc ct tu ur re e- -c co on nd du uc ct t- -p pe er rf fo or rm ma an nc ce e   p pa ar ra ad di ig gm m
(SCP) and t th he e   e ef ff fi ic ci ie en nc cy y   h hy yp po ot th he es si is s   (ES), as well as a number of formal approaches. The two most
common non-formal structural approaches measure the impact of concentration on competition
(Reid, 1987, Scherer and Ross, 1990). The SCP paradigm (relates structure and conduct to
performance) would suggest that more concentrated markets tend to be more collusive. The
efficiency hypothesis, developed by Demsetz (1973) and Peltzman (1977) offers a competing
explanation of the relation between market structure and performance. This theory states that if
banks enjoy a higher degree of efficiency than their competitors, they can: increase shareholder
value or will gain market share by reducing prices. Also, concentration ratios are often used in
structural models explaining competitive performance in the banking industry as the result of
market structure (Bikker 2004, p. 63).
In reaction to the theoretical and empirical deficiencies of structural models7, n no on n- -s st tr ru uc ct tu ur ra al l
models of competitive behavior have been developed: the Iwata model (1974), the Bresnahan model
(1982), the Lau model (1982), and the Panzar and Rosse (1987) approach. These non-structural
approaches do not take into account explicite the impact of concentration on competition.
T Th he e   P Pa an nz za ar r   a an nd d   R Ro os ss se e   M Me et th ho od do ol lo og gy y
This study assesses the n no on n- -s st tr ru uc ct tu ur ra al l   a ap pp pr ro oa ac ch h for the banking industry developed by Panzar
and Rosse (1987) using bank level data. This test was derived from a general banking market
model8, which determines the equilibrium output and the equilibrium number of banks, by
maximizing profits at both the bank level and the industry level.
In order to identify the nature of the market structure (monopoly or oligopoly, monopoly
competition or perfect competition) t th he e   P Pa an nz za ar r   a an nd d   R Ro os ss se e   m mo od de el l (P-R) provides a measure called
t th he e   H H- -s st ta at ti is st ti ic c. Panzar and Rosse have shown that the sum of the elasticity of the total interest
revenues, with respect to changes in banksÕ input prices (wi), allows inference about the banksÕ
competitive conduct9 (see equation (1))10.
(1)
where: R*















7 For more see: Hempell (2002, p. 9).
8 Cournot oligopoly model with profit maximinization by collusive Cournot oligopolies.
9 For more formal specification see: Bikker (2004, p. 85).
10 The above methodology entails various assumptions, for example, that banks are acting exclusively as financial
intermediaries, or that higher input prices are not associated with higher quality services that generate higher revenues,
and finally, given the volatile economic environment in the economies covered by this study, that one needs to be
observing banks in a long-run equilibrium. For more information see: Gelos and Roldos (2002, p. 13) and see: Bikker
(2004, pp. 85-86).2
Competition in the Polish banking industry in 1997-2002
MATERIAüY I STUDIA PAPER 32 11
The estimated value of the H-statistic ranges between -¥ and 1. Moreover, Panzar and Rosse
(1987) have shown that in market equilibrium, p pe er rf fe ec ct t   c co om mp pe et ti it ti io on n is indicated by the H-statistic
equal to unity. Due to the fact that, under perfect competition an increase in input prices and thus
in average costs should lead to a proportional price increase and (at the firm level) to a proportional
rise in revenues. Under m mo on no op po ol ly y, an increase in input prices will increase marginal costs, reduce
equilibrium output and consequently reduce total revenues and the H-statistic is negative or equal
to zero. If the market structure is characterized by m mo on no op po ol li is st ti ic c   c co om mp pe et ti it ti io on n, , the H-statistics will lie
between zero and unity11 (see Table 3).
A critical feature of the H-statistic is that the tests must be undertaken on observations that
are in a long-run equilibrium12. To test for an equilibrium, one can calculate the Panzar and Rosse
H-statistic using the return on assets (ROA) as the dependent variable in place of the interest
revenue function in the regression equation (2). A value of H<0 would show non-equilibrium,
whereas H=0 would prove an equilibrium (see Table 3).
The nature of the estimation of the H-statistic, means that we are especially interested in
understanding how interest revenues react to variations in the cost figures. We assume that banks
use three inputs (i.e. funds, labor, and capital), which is consistent with the intermediation approach.
In order to estimate the H H- -s st ta at ti is st ti ic c for the Polish banking sector the following reduced form
revenue equation has been estimated13:
ln(IR) = c +a1*lnwl + a2*lnwp + a3*lnwk + d*oth                                                      (2)
where:
Dependent variable: 
IR Ð interest revenue function which was defined in the following way: ,
Three factor prices:
wl Ð unit price of labor which was defined in the following way: ,
wp Ð unit price of funds which was defined in the following way: ,








Table 3 Interpretation of the Panzar-Rosse the H-statistics
V Va allu ue es s   o of f   H H C Co om mp pe et tiit tiiv ve e   E En nv viir ro on nm me en nt t
H< _ 0 Monopoly or perfectly collusive oligopoly
0<H<1 Monopolistic competition
H=1 Perfect competition, natural monopoly in a perfectly contestable market, or sales maximizing firm subject to a break-even constraint 
V Va allu ue es s   o of f   H H E Eq qu uiilliib br riiu um m   t te es st t
0<H Disequilibrium
H=0 Equilibrium
Source: Hempell (2000, p. 8), Bikker (2004, p. 87).
11 For more see: Bikker (2004, pp. 86-87).
12 The empirical test for an equilibrium is justified on the grounds that competitive capital markets will equalize the risk-
adjusted rate of returns across banks such that, in an equilibrium, rates of return should not be correlated statistically
with input prices.
13 See also Gelos and Roldos (2002, p. 14).12
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Other bank specific variables:
oth Ð the size of nonperforming loans (NPL),
and c Ð constant.
In this study, which uses panel data for Polish commercial banks and applies the equation (2)
among the different panel regression techniques, fixed effects estimations have been used. The sum
of the factors prices function (denoted with the coefficients a1, a2 and a3) of the reduced-form of
revenues (see equation (2)) constitutes the value of t th he e   H H- -s st ta at ti is st ti ic c for the Polish banking sector.
The Panzar and Rosse approach also has some limitations: general limitations are the
assumptions made as well as the resulting biases when applying this technique to real world (bank)
data (see Hempell 2000, p. 9). Despite these limitations, the modelÕs special advantages, make it a
valuable tool in assessing market conditions. The P-R methodology analyses directly the competitive
conduct of banks, based on the comparative static properties of reduced form of revenue function,
without employing any structural measures (see Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki and Staikouras (2004, p. 16)).
T Th he e   d da at ta a
The panel data for this analysis comprises all Polish commercial banks covered by the National
Bank of PolandÕs balance sheet as well as profit and loss accounts statistics. These statistics consist
of annual data from all banks reporting to the National Bank of Poland and cover the period from
1997:Q4 to 2002:Q4.
E Em mp pi ir ri ic ca al l   R Re es su ul lt ts s
For the Polish banking sector the H H- -s st ta at ti is st ti ic c has been estimated for each year of the analyzed
period 1997-2002, as well as for two sub-periods: 1997-1999 and 2000-2002. An equilibrium test
is provided for the period 1997-2002, after replacement of the dependent variable by the ROA
ratio. The hypothesis of equilibrium (H=0) is confirmed for the Polish banking sector. The
performed Wald test14 could not reject the hypothesis of equilibrium at conventional statistical
levels (see Statistical Annex Table A5). Also, the hypothesis of equilibrium was confirmed for 10 new
EU countries by Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki and Staikouras (2004, p. 31).
The empirical results with respect to the yearly H-statistic in the period 1997-2002, listed in
Table 4, have shown monopolistic competition15 as a characteristic of the analyzed banksÕ behavior
14 Wald coefficient restriction test.
15 The values are in the range of above zero and below unity and The Wald tests reveal that H differs significantly from
both 0 and 1, and therefore rejects the hypotheses of both monopoly and perfect competition for Polish banking sector
at the 1% significance level.
Table 4 Estimation results of the yearly H-statistics
O Ov ve er ra allll   s sa am mp plle e
1997 Ð 1998 H 0.75*
p(F-test) (0.000)
1998 Ð 1999 H 0.78*
p(F-test) (0.000)
1999 Ð 2000 H 0.60*
p(F-test) (0.000)
2000 Ð 2001 H 0.65*
p(F-test) (0.000)
2001 Ð 2002 H 0.84*
p(F-test) (0.000)
Note: *H=0 and H=1 rejected (level of confidence 99.9 per cent).
Source: own analysis. 2
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for each analyzed year. The details of the above estimation have been presented in Table A3 of the
Statistical Annex. There is a slight upward tendency in the yearly H-statistics values between 1997-2002.
The increase in competition has also resulted in squeezed profit margins in the Polish banking sector
(see Table 2).
The share in total assets, in loans and in deposits of the five, ten and the fifteen largest banks
and the HHI indices, increased in the period 1997-2001 and decreased slightly in 2002 (see Table 1).
Additionally the level of foreign bank participation grew in the period 1997-2002. However, the
share of banks with a majority foreign equity, stabilized between 2000 and 2002. For that reason, the
other estimation concerned two periods: 1997-1999 and 2000-200216. The details of the above
estimation have been presented in Table A4 of the Statistical Annex. The results of the estimation (H1 and
H2) have shown a slight increase in the H statistic between two periods: 1997-1999 and 2000-2002 (see
Table 5). However, the test for significance of the differences in the H-values between the two periods
has shown that there is no significant difference between H1 and H2.
The estimation results of the H-statistics for each year as well as for the two periods have
shown a slight increase in competition in the period 1997-2002. Moreover, the positive
correlation17 between the H-statistics and the measure of foreign bank participation between
1997-1999 and 2000Ð2002, supports the argument that foreign competition has helped to
attenuate any reductions in the competitive intensity resulting from consolidation. It might mean
that the increasing participation of foreign banks in the Polish banking sector have prevented
a decline in competitive pressures.
Additionally, based on equation (2), the degree of competition has been estimated, for
banking sectors in the Czech Republic and Hungary, for the period 1997-2001. Data for the Czech
Republic and Hungary were obtained from BankScope18.
Monopolistic competition19 has also been found for those countries (see Table 6). For
more details of this estimation see Table A9 and Table A10 in the Statistical Annex.
16 The panel data consists of 208 bank observations for the years 1997-1999, and 144 observations for the years 2000-
2002, the estimations were made with the use of EViews 4.1.
17 The results of correlation for the two sub-periods: 1 and 0.63, respectively.
18 The panel data for the period 1997-2001 consists of 33 yearly bank observations for the Czech Republic, and 42
observations for Hungary. The estimations were made with EViews 4.1. The Wald test performed could not reject the
hypothesis of equilibrium at conventional statistical levels (see Statistical Annex Table A10) for the Czech Republic.
However the Wald test for Hungary indicated that H is significantly different to zero (see Statistical Annex Table A10).
It should be noticed that results for the Czech Republic and Hungary are tentative.
19 The H-statistics are statistically different from both zero and unity.
Table 5 Estimation results of the H-statistics (H1 and H2) for two periods: 1997-1999 and
2000-2002 
Note: *H=0 and H=1 rejected (level of confidence 99.9 per cent).
Source: own analysis. 
O Ov ve er ra allll   s sa am mp plle e
1997 - 1999 H1 0.66*
p(F-test) (0.000)
2000 - 2002 H2 0.69*
p(F-test) (0.000)
H: H1=H2 p(F-test) (0.3398)  
Table 6 Estimation results of the H-statistics for the Czech Republic and Hungary for 1997-2001
Note: *H=0 and H=1 rejected (level of confidence 99.9 per cent).
Source: own analysis.
C Cz ze ec ch h   R Re ep pu ub blliic c H Hu un ng ga ar ry y
1997 Ð 2001 H-statistic 0.58* 0.65*
p(F-test) (0.000) (0.000)  14
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Also, a number of analysts who have investigated competition in the EU countries using the
P-R approach have found that European banks were operating under conditions of monopolistic
competition (e.g. Bikker (2004), Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki and Staikouras (2004)).
The econometric results20 based on the Panzar-Rosse methodology obtained by
Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki and Staikouras for the EU-15 and 10 new EU countries for 1998-2002, have
been presented in Table 7.
Table 7 Estimation results of the H-statistics for the EU-15 and 10 new EU countries for
1998-2002 
D De ep pe en nd de en nt t   V Va ar riia ab blle e E EU U- -1 15 5 N Ne ew w   E EU U   C Co ou un nt tr riie es s
1998 Ð 2002 Interest Income/Assets H-statistic = 0.54 H-statistic = 0.78 
1998 Ð 2002 Total revenues/Assets H-statistic = 0.61 H-statistic = 0.46
Source: Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki and Staikouras (2004, p. 37 and p .39).
20 Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki and Staikouras (2004, pp. 29-30) have found that lower barriers to entry in the examined
period, such as allowing increased participation of foreign banks in the new EU banking sectors, appear to have
prevented a decline in competitive pressures, see also Gelos and Roldos (2002, p. 21).3
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Efficiency in the Polish banking industry in 1997-2002
Ð non-parametric approach
Measuring bank efficiency
Efficiency is a broad concept that can be applied to many dimensions of a firmÕs activities and
there are many definitions of efficiency. This paper will deal with two definitions of efficiency:
t te ec ch hn ni ic ca al l   e ef ff fi ic ci ie en nc cy y and s sc ca al le e   e ef ff fi ic ci ie en nc cy y. T Te ec ch hn ni ic ca al l   e ef ff fi ic ci ie en nc cy y is related to the production of outputs
given some inputs: a production plan is technically efficient if there is no way to produce the same
output(s) with less input(s) or to produce more output(s) with the same inputs21. S Sc ca al le e   e ef ff fi ic ci ie en nc cy y is
defined relatively to the form of the locus of technically efficient production plans22. Technical
efficiency considers scale and scope economies23: an efficient firm is the one that reaches the
optimal size.
The definitions of efficiency call for different measurement methodologies. The most
common efficiency estimation techniques are non-parametric and parametric. There are two main
non-parametric approaches: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Free Disposal Hull (FDH). There
are three main parametric frontier approaches: Stochastic Frontier Approaches (SFA), Thick Frontier
Approach (TFA) and Distribution-Free Approach (DFA). Non-parametric methods generally yield
slightly lower mean efficiency estimates and seem to have a greater dispersion than the results of
the parametric models24.
In this paper, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) has been used to analyze efficiency in the Polish
banking sector. DEA is a non-parametric linear programming technique that computes a comparative
ratio of outputs to inputs for each unit, which is reported as the relative efficiency score25.
This method is considered to be suitable, and could be successfully applied, to banking
systems in transition countries26.
Investigation of all technical efficiency measures of banks is a very important issue due to that
fact that all the technical efficiency measures, i.e. technical efficiency, scale efficiency and scope
efficiency, are considered as factors of a bankÕs competitiveness27.
The process of changes of technical and scale efficiency and productivity growth in the Polish
commercial banks in 1997-2002 was analyzed by comparing the technical efficiency measures
e_crs, e_vrs, e_nirs28 and the Malmquist output-oriented productivity indices29. In order to identify
types of return to scale effects the NIRS DEA model has been used30.
21 See: Favero and Papi (1995, p. 38).
22 See: Favero and Papi (1995, p. 38).
23 In this paper we consider only economy of scale, without prices.
24 Berger and Humphrey (1997, pp. 175-212).
25 Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978, pp. 429-444).
26 See: Grigorian and Manole (2002, p.18).
27 Rogowski (1998, p. 58).
28 The following symbols have been applied in this paper: e_crs Ð measure of efficiency under constant returns to scale
assumption (CRST), e_vrs - measure of efficiency under variable returns to scale assumption (VRST), e_nirs Ð measure of
efficiency under non-increasing returns to scale assumption (NIRST).
29  Malmquist output-based productivity index (M) which was divided into technical efficiency change (E) and
technological change (TC).
30 The NIRS model identifies in which region the entity is functioning: increasing, decreasing or constant returns to scale.16
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The data
The panel data for this analysis comprises all Polish commercial banks covered by the National
Bank of PolandÕs balance sheet as well as profit and loss accounts statistics. These statistics consist
of annual data for the period 1997:Q4 to 2002:Q4.
Technical efficiency, scale efficiency and Malmquist productivity indices have been calculated
for individual banks for each year. Furthermore, the average of the above measures has been
calculated for the entire sample group of banks31.
Empirical Results
In the analyzed period progressive M&As had an impact on the banking sector efficiency. In
1997-2001, a slight improvement of efficiency in the Polish commercial banking sector was noticed
(see Table A11 in Statistical Annex), as a result of an increase in the value of the average measures of
technical efficiency (e_crs) and scale efficiency (e_s). The increase in the scale efficiency measure (e_s)
reflects the positive effects of scale economies taking place in the Polish banking sector32. In 2002, an
economic slowdown resulted in a slight decrease in all technical efficiency measures. It means that the
advantage of M&A is not able to balance disadvantages of a slowdown in the Polish economy.
The benchmark of the banks with regard to assessed technical and scale efficiency measures,
shows that a majority of the analyzed banks were operating within increasing and constant returns
to scale region33. It means that there is always room for new M&A in the Polish banking sector,
which allows for a rise in efficiency and competitiveness of Polish banks.
All technical efficiency measures are relative. To determine if efficiency improvement is
achieved at a certain time, the Malmquist productivity index must be analyzed.
Following the results of the Malmquist productivity index estimation (see Table A12 in
Statistical Annex), it can be seen that productivity increased in the period 1997-1999 and leveled off
in 2000. In the period 2000-2002, the value of the average Malmquist index (M) slightly increased.
That was caused by the deterioration in relative efficiency (E) and a slight technological progress (TC).
There is evidence of M&A exploiting technical efficiency, scale efficiency and productivity in
the Polish banking sector during the analyzed period. All the banks involved in the M&A processes
have significantly improved their efficiency measures and productivity indices34. The above results
of the assessment of technical efficiency measures, have suggested that Polish banks improved their
competitiveness during the analyzed period.
Additionally, for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the technical efficiency of the
banking sector using variable returns to scale technology (VRST) has been investigated based on a
dataset compiled by BankScope35. The highest value of technical efficiency (e_vrts) has been found
for Hungary (see Figure 1).
31 Measuring efficiency and productivity requires the specific description of inputs and outputs. There is no consensus
amongst researchers about bank inputs and outputs. In the literature on this subject, one can identify five approaches
to the input-output specification: the production approach (PA), the intermediation approach (IA), the asset approach
(AA), the user cost approach (UCA) and the value added approach (VAA).In this study, input-output specification has
been developed specially for the Polish banking system and, four output variables were chosen: net loans, current
deposits, time deposits, net fees and commissions, and three input variables: labour (number of employees), fixed
assets, non-performing loans. For more explanation see: Paw¸owska (2003, p. 14).
32 Paw¸owska (2003, p. 18).
33 For the three efficiency measures (e_crs, e_nirs, e_vrs), the following property also holds: 0 < e_crs £ e_nirs £ e_vrs£ 1
see: Lthgren and Tambor (1996, p. 5). If e_crs = e_nirs this means that a firm is not scale efficient and is operating with
increasing returns to scale.
34 Paw¸owska (2003, p. 18).
35 I have defined three inputs: labor, fixed assets, interest expenditures and three outputs: deposits, net loans, liquid
assets, see: Grigorian and Manole (2002, p. 10).3
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One of the reasons, of such results may be that banks in Hungary had the lowest share of
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Conclusion
The empirical results, for the analyzed period of 1997-2002, have shown: 
Firstly, that in Poland there is monopolistic competition. Furthermore, despite the decrease in
the number of banks during the investigated period and a slight increase in concentration measures
during that time, there are no indications of a less competitive behavior of commercial banks in the
second half of this period. On the contrary, we have noticed a slight increase in the degree of
competition between 1997 and 2002. It means that the process of consolidation in the Polish
banking system, which results in a slight increase in concentration measures, has not yet translated
into a decline in competitive pressures. Apparently, as confirmed by a positive correlation between
the  H statistics and measures of foreign bank participation, foreign participation may have
preserved competitive pressures. Similar conclusion for new EU banking sectors, has been fund by
Gelos and Roldos (2002, p. 20) for the period 1994-2000 and by Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki and
Staikouras (2004, p. 29-30) for the period 1998-2002.
Secondly, the benchmark classification resulting from technical efficiency investigation for the
analyzed period, shows that the majority of banks are operating with increasing returns to scale. It
means that there is always room for new M&A. The positive results obtained from the assessment
of M&A conducted by commercial banks show that these processes should be continued.
Thirdly, it seems that foreign entry in the Polish financial market (which brings know-how and
implementation of new solutions), connected with the M&A process and a rapid growth of IT in
Polish commercial banks, is one of the reasons for improving technical efficiency measures and
productivity indices. It has also resulted in the increasing level of competition in the Polish banking
sector.
However, the EUÕs biggest success has been the Single Market which has meant more
consumers, more competitors, more opportunities for business and less restrictive regulation. It has
been a mechanism for increasing competition, for delivering more choice, lower prices and higher
quality to consumers. Furthermore, the upcoming Basel Accord on capital requirements and a new
regulatory regime for banks, are developments which will affect competition, consolidation and
efficiency in the banking industry. The effect of these changes currently seems to be difficult to
predict.5
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Table A1 Credit Institutions in Poland (1997- 2002) 
F Fiin na an nc ciia all   I In ns st tiit tu ut tiio on n                                                                            N Nu um mb be er r   o of f   I In ns st tiit tu ut tiio on ns s   
1 19 99 97 7 1 19 99 98 8 1 19 99 99 9 2 20 00 00 0 2 20 00 01 1 2 20 00 02 2
1. Banks 1378 1272 858 754 713 667
1.1 Commercial banks 83 83 77 74 71 62
1.2 Cooperative banks 1295 1189 781 680 642 605 
2. Credit Unions 198 220 228 147 141 124 
A As ss se et ts s   ( (iin n   P PL LN N   b biilllliio on n) )
1 19 99 97 7 1 19 99 98 8 1 19 99 99 9 2 20 00 00 0 2 20 00 01 1 2 20 00 02 2
1. Banks 251.6 320.7 365.2 430.4 471.7 469.1 
1.1 Commercial banks 240.3 307.0 349.8 412.3 450.2 445.7
1.2 Cooperative banks 11.3 13.7 15.4 18.1 21.5 23.4
2. Credit Unions 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.8 2.52 
F Fiin na an nc ciia all   S Se ec ct to or r   A As ss se et ts s   a as s   P Pe er rc ce en nt ta ag ge e   o of f   G GD DP P   ( (% %) )
1 19 99 97 7 1 19 99 98 8 1 19 99 99 9 2 20 00 00 0 2 20 00 01 1 2 20 00 02 2
1. Banks 53.3 58.0 59.2 60.4 63.0 61.0 
1.1 Commercial banks 50.9 55.5 56.7 57.9 60.1 57.9
1.2 Cooperative banks 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.9  3.1
2. Credit Unions 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3
Source: NBP, National Association of Credit Unions.20
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Note: 
1The number of commercial banks includes all banks (and also, banks declared bankrupt or under liquidation).
2Loans net of loan loss provisions.
Source: NBP, National Association of Credit Unions.
Table A2 Ownership Structure of the Banking Sector (1997- 2002)
N Nu um mb be er r   o of f   B Ba an nk ks s1 1
1 19 99 97 7 1 19 99 98 8 1 19 99 99 9 2 20 00 00 0 2 20 00 01 1 2 20 00 02 2
1.Commercial banks 83 83 77 74 71 62 
1.1.Banks with majority of state ownership 15 13 7 7 7 8 
1.2.Private sector banks of which 68 70 70 67 64 54
1.2.1.Banks with majority Polish equity 39 39 31 20 16 7
1.2.2.Banks with majority foreign equity 29 31 39 47 48 47
2.Cooperative banks  1295 1189 781 680 642 605 
Total (1+2) 1378 1272 858 754 713 667 
T Th he e   B Ba an nk kiin ng g   S Se ec ct to or r   A As ss se et ts s   ( (% %) )   
1 19 99 97 7 1 19 99 98 8 1 19 99 99 9 2 20 00 00 0 2 20 00 01 1 2 20 00 02 2
1.Commercial banks  95.5 95.7 95.8 95.8 95.4 95.0
1.1.Banks with majority of state ownership 49.3 45.9 23.9 22.9 23.5 25.3
1.2.Private sector banks of which 46.2 49.8 71.8 72.9 71.9 69.7
1.2.1.Banks with majority Polish equity 30.9 33.2 24.6 3.4 3.2 2.5
1.2.2.Banks with majority foreign equity 15.3 16.6 47.2 69.5 68.7 67.2 
2.Cooperative banks  4.5 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.6 5.0 
Total (1+2) 100 100 100 100 100 100
L Lo oa an ns s2 2 t to o   N No on n- -F Fiin na an nc ciia all   S Se ec ct to or r   ( (% %) )
1 19 99 97 7 1 19 99 98 8 1 19 99 99 9 2 20 00 00 0 2 20 00 01 1 2 20 00 02 2
1.Commercial banks  94.5 95.0 94.9 94.6 94.2 93.5 
1.1.Banks with majority of state ownership 43.2 23.2 20.5 21.2 20.5 21.4
1.2. Private sector banks of which 51.3 72.4 73.7 73.4 73.7 72.1
1.2.1.Banks with majority Polish equity 33.1 3.2 2.4 3.2 2.4 1.6
1.2.2.Banks with majority foreign equity 18.2 21.9 50.9 70.2 71.3 70.5
2.Cooperative banks 5.5 5.0 5.8 5.4 5.8 6.5
Total (1+2) 100 100 100 100 100 100
D De ep po os siit t   o of f   N No on n- -F Fiin na an nc ciia all   S Se ec ct to or r   ( (% %) )
1 19 99 97 7 1 19 99 98 8 1 19 99 99 9 2 20 00 00 0 2 20 00 01 1 2 20 00 02 2
1.Commercial banks 94.8 94.8 95.5 94.8 94.4 93.8
1.1.Banks with majority of state ownership 58.0 53.6 23.2 28.9 28.7 30.5
1.2. Private sector banks. of which 36.8  41.2 72.4 65.9 65.7 63.3
1.2.1.Banks with majority Polish equity 24.1 27.5 20.1 2.4  1.8 1.1
1.2.2.Banks with majority foreign equity 12.7 13.7 45.6 63.5 63.9 62.2
2.Cooperative banks 5.2 5.2 4.0  5.2 5.6 6.2
Total (1+2) 100 100 100 100 100 100 5
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Table A3 Estimation results of the yearly HÐstatistic
D De ep pe en nd de en nt t   V Va ar riia ab blle e: :   L LO OG G( (I IR R) )
M Me et th ho od d: :   P Po oo olle ed d   L Le ea as st t   S Sq qu ua ar re es s
S Sa am mp plle e: :   1 19 99 97 7- -1 19 99 98 8
Number of cross-sections used: 77
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 144
Cross sections without valid observations dropped
V Va ar riia ab blle e C Co oe ef ff fiic ciie en nt t S St td d. .   E Er rr ro or r t t- -S St ta at tiis st tiic c P Pr ro ob b. .
LOG(WLAB) 0.617216 0.074402 8.295738 0.0000
LOG(WFUN) 0.083596 0.027210 3.072261 0.0032 
LOG(WCAP) 0.050947 0.070864 0.718939 0.4749 
S Sa am mp plle e: :   1 19 99 98 8- -1 19 99 99 9
Number of cross-sections used: 78
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 138
Cross sections without valid observations dropped
V Va ar riia ab blle e C Co oe ef ff fiic ciie en nt t S St td d. .   E Er rr ro or r t t- -S St ta at tiis st tiic c P Pr ro ob b. .
LOG(WLAB) 0.683764 0.128518 5.320382 0.0000
LOG(WFUN) 0.177585 0.042690 4.159850 0.0001
LOG(WCAP) -0.074801 0.052288 -1.430550 0.1582
S Sa am mp plle e: :   1 19 99 99 9- -2 20 00 00 0
Number of cross-sections used: 65
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 121
Cross sections without valid observations dropped
V Va ar riia ab blle e C Co oe ef ff fiic ciie en nt t S St td d. .   E Er rr ro or r t t- -S St ta at tiis st tiic c P Pr ro ob b. .
LOG(WLAB) 0.627015 0.067815 9.245902 0.0000
LOG(WFUN) 0.025177 0.025459 0.988901 0.3274
LOG(WCAP) -0.054243 0.049586 -1.093915 0.2791
S Sa am mp plle e: :   2 20 00 00 0- -2 20 00 01 1
Number of cross-sections used: 60
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 104
Cross sections without valid observations dropped
V Va ar riia ab blle e C Co oe ef ff fiic ciie en nt t S St td d. .   E Er rr ro or r t t- -S St ta at tiis st tiic c P Pr ro ob b. .
LOG(WLAB) 0.606051 0.096030 6.311071 0.0000 
LOG(WFUN) 0.077542 0.058641 1.322309 0.1938 
LOG(WCAP) -0.034266 0.054008 -0.634457 0.5295
S Sa am mp plle e: :   2 20 00 01 1- -2 20 00 02 2
Number of cross-sections used: 50
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 87
Cross sections without valid observations dropped
V Va ar riia ab blle e C Co oe ef ff fiic ciie en nt t S St td d. .   E Er rr ro or r t t- -S St ta at tiis st tiic c P Pr ro ob b. .
LOG(WLAB) 0.560041 0.141177 3.966944 0.0004
LOG(WFUN) 0.366480 0.052663 6.959023 0.0000
LOG(WCAP) -0.075174 0.125953 -0.596838 0.5548
Note: 
Dependent variable: interest income/total assets - is sign as ãIRÓ.
Unit factor prices: wl Ð unit price of labor is sign as ÒWLABÓ, wp Ð unit price of funds is sign as ÒWFUNÓ, 
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Table A6 Net interest margin (NIM) for Banking Sectors in the Czech Republic and Hungary (%)
Source: the National Bank of Hungary, the Czech National Bank.
1 19 99 97 7 1 19 99 98 8 1 19 99 99 9 2 20 00 00 0    2 20 00 01 1
Czech Republic 2.19 3.47 2.83 2.55 2.62
Hungary 4.5 4.5 4.1 3.9 4.1  
Table A7 Numbers of Banks, by Country, 1997-2001
9 99 97 7 1 19 99 98 8 1 19 99 99 9 2 20 00 00 0 2 20 00 01 1
Czech Republic 50 45 42 40 38
Hungary 46 45 44 43 42  
Source: the National Bank of Hungary, the Czech National Bank.
Table A8 Non-performing loans (NPL) for Banking Sectors in the Czech Republic and Hungary (%)
1 19 99 97 7 1 19 99 98 8 1 19 99 99 9 2 20 00 00 0 2 20 00 01 1
Czech Republic 20.8 20.3 21.5 19.4 13.8 
Hungary 6.8 8.2 4.6 3.3 3.4
Source: the National Bank of Hungary, the Czech National Bank.
Table A5 Equilibrium Test for Polish Banking Sector (1997-2002)
W Wa alld d   T Te es st t   f fo or r   H H= =0 0: :
Test Statistic Value df Probab.
F-statistic 0.000845 (1, 213) 0.9768
Chi-square 0.000845 1 0.9768 
N Nu ullll   H Hy yp po ot th he es siis s   S Su um mm ma ar ry y: 
Normalized Restriction (=0) Value Std. Err.
H H- -s st ta at tiis st tiic c -0.018177 0.625189 
Note: In linear regression on equation (1) a dependent variable has been used ROA. H<0 is disequilibrium while H=0
is equilibrium. Equilibrium is confirmed for the Polish banking sector (level of confidence 99.9 per cent).
Source: own analysis.
Table A4 Estimation results of H-statistics for two periods: 1997-1999, 2000-2002
D De ep pe en nd de en nt t   V Va ar riia ab blle e: :   L LO OG G( (I IR R) )
M Me et th ho od d: :   P Po oo olle ed d   L Le ea as st t   S Sq qu ua ar re es s
S Sa am mp plle e: :   1 19 99 97 7- -1 19 99 99 9
Number of cross-sections used: 81
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 208
Cross sections without valid observations dropped 
V Va ar riia ab blle e C Co oe ef ff fiic ciie en nt t S St td d. .   E Er rr ro or r t t- -S St ta at tiis st tiic c P Pr ro ob b. .
LOG(WLAB) 0.580025 0.060926 9.520115 0.0000
LOG(WFUN) 0.139551 0.024571 5.679490 0.0000
LOG(WCAP) -0.062570 0.037459 -1.670363 0.0974
S Sa am mp plle e: :   2 20 00 00 0- -2 20 00 02 2
Number of cross-sections used: 63
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 144
Cross sections without valid observations dropped 
V Va ar riia ab blle e C Co oe ef ff fiic ciie en nt t S St td d. .   E Er rr ro or r t t- -S St ta at tiis st tiic c P Pr ro ob b. .
LOG(WLAB) 0.451061 0.091086 4.952032 0.0000
LOG(WFUN) 0.363647 0.039597 9.183704 0.0000
LOG(WCAP) -0.124258 0.060526 -2.052973 0.0435
Note: Dependent variable: interest income/total assets - is sign as ãIRÓ.
Unit factor prices: wl Ð unit price of labor is sign as ÒWLABÓ, wp Ð unit price of funds is sign as ÒWFUNÓ, wk - unit price
of capital is sign as ÒWCAPÓ. H-statistic is the sum of elasticities of interest rate revenues.
Source: own analysis.5
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Table A9 Estimation results of H-statistics, by Country
Note: Dependent variable: interest income/total assets is sign as ãIRÓ.
Unit factor prices: wl Ð unit price of labor is sign as ÒWLABÓ, wp Ð unit price of funds is sign as ÒWFUNÓ, wk - unit price
of capital is sign as ÒWCAPÓ. H-statistic is the sum of elasticities of interest rate revenues.
Source: own analysis.
D De ep pe en nd de en nt t   V Va ar riia ab blle e: :   L LO OG G( (I IR R) )
M Me et th ho od d: :   G GL LS S   ( (C Cr ro os ss s   S Se ec ct tiio on n   W We eiig gh ht ts s) )   
H Hu un ng ga ar ry y   
S Sa am mp plle e: :   1 19 99 97 7- -2 20 00 01 1
Number of cross-sections used: 16 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 42
One-step weighting matrix 
Cross sections without valid observations dropped 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
LOG(WLAB) 0.019008 0.071031 0.267608 0.7914
LOG(WFUN) 0.601972 0.027997 21.50158 0.0000
LOG(WCAP) 0.032347 0.012351 2.618946 0.0153
T Th he e   C Cz ze ec ch h   R Re ep pu ub blliic c
S Sa am mp plle e: :   1 19 99 97 7- -2 20 00 01 1
Number of cross-sections used: 8
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 33
One-step weighting matrix
Cross sections without valid observations dropped
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LOG(WLAB) 0.124841 0.037871 3.296467 0.0033
LOG(WFUN) 0.466126 0.066066 7.055416 0.0000
LOG(WCAP) -0.009576 0.025052 -0.382254 0.7059
Table A10 Equilibrium Test for the Czech Republic and Hungary (1997-2001)
W Wa alld d   T Te es st t: :
H Hu un ng ga ar ry y
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
F-statistic 1.278381 (1, 24) 0.2694
Chi-square 1.278381 1 0.2582
N Nu ullll   H Hy yp po ot th he es siis s   S Su um mm ma ar ry y: :
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value  Std. Err. 
H H- -s st ta at tiis st tiic c 0.707163 0.625445
T Th he e   C Cz ze ec ch h   R Re ep pu ub blliic c
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
F-statistic 0.000163 (1, 24) 0.9899
Chi-square 0.000163 1 0.9898
N Nu ullll   H Hy yp po ot th he es siis s   S Su um mm ma ar ry y: :   
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
H H- -s st ta at tiis st tiic c -0.002919 0.228739
Note: In linear regression on equation (1) as dependent variable has been used ROA. H<0 is disequilibrium while H=0




National Bank of Poland
Table A12 Average Changes of the Malmquist Productivity Index (M), Technical Efficiency
Change (E) and Technological Change (TC) in Period 1997-2002
Y Ye ea ar rs s S St ta at tiis st tiic c E E T TC C M M
1997/1998 A Av ve er ra ag ge e 1 1. .1 10 0 1.11 1.24
Number of banks that increase productivity 26 32 30
Number of banks that decrease productivity 19 17 19
Lack of change 8 3 3
1998/1999 A Av ve er ra ag ge e 1 1. .2 28 8 0.91 1.06
Number of banks that increase productivity 27 16 25
Number of banks that decrease productivity 16 31 22
Lack of change 9 5 4
1999/2000 A Av ve er ra ag ge e 1 1. .0 08 8 0.90 0.96
Number of banks that increase productivity 22 6 20
Number of banks that decrease productivity 16 37 23
Lack of change 13 10 8
2000/2001 A Av ve er ra ag ge e 1 1. .0 03 3 0.99 1.01
Number  of banks that increase productivity 19 20 23
Number of banks that decrease productivity 16 20 17
Lack of change 12 7 7
2001/2002 A Av ve er ra ag ge e 0 0. .9 92 2 1.00 0.92
Number  of banks that increase productivity 8 18 13
Number of banks that decrease productivity 23 21 25
Lack of change 9 2 2
Source: own analysis. See Paw¸owska (2003, p. 33).
Y Ye ea ar r S St ta at tiis st tiic c e e_ _c cr rs s e e_ _v vr rs s e e_ _s s e e_ _n niir rs s
1997 A Av ve er ra ag ge e 0 0. .6 64 4 0 0. .7 76 6 0 0. .8 85 5 0 0. .7 75 5
standard deviation 0.30 0.30 0.18 0.30 
min value 0.10 0.10 0.44 0.10
Number of efficient banks 13 22 13  22 
1998 A Av ve er ra ag ge e 0 0. .6 66 6 0 0. .7 79 9 0 0. .8 84 4 0 0. .7 79 9
standard deviation 0.29  0.29 0.18 0.28
min value 0.09 0.10 0.41 0.10
Number of efficient banks 12 25 12 24 
1999 A Av ve er ra ag ge e 0 0. .7 72 2 0 0. .8 82 2 0 0. .8 89 9 0 0. .8 80 0
standard deviation 0.27 0.26 0.14 0.27 
min value 0.16 0.18 0.53 0.18 
Number of efficient banks 18 28 17 25
2000 A Av ve er ra ag ge e 0 0. .7 73 3 0 0. .8 81 1 0 0. .9 90 0 0 0. .7 78 8
standard deviation 0.25  0.23  0.12 0.24 
min value 0.31 0.33 0.53 0.31
Number of efficient banks 18 20 15 21
2001 A Av ve er ra ag ge e 0 0. .7 74 4 0 0. .8 81 1 0 0. .9 93 3 0 0. .7 79 9
standard deviation 0.25 0.25 0.10 0.26
min value 0.13 0.19 0.67 0.13
Number of efficient banks 16 21 16 21
2002 A Av ve er ra ag ge e 0 0. .7 72 2 0 0. .8 83 3 0 0. .8 87 7 0 0. .7 77 7
standard deviation 0.25  0.25 0.10 0.26
min value 0.13 0.19 0.67 0.13
Number of efficient banks 11 20 11 16 
Source: own analysis. See Paw¸owska (2003, p. 32).
Table A11 Average Technical Efficiency, Scale Efficiency, in Period 1997-20026
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Glossary
D Da at ta a   E En nv ve el lo op pm me en nt t   A An na al ly ys si is s (DEA) Ð A non-parametric linear programming technique that
computes a comparative ratio of outputs to inputs for each unit, which is reported as the relative
efficiency score. The efficiency score is usually expressed as a number between 0 and 1. This
method assumes that there are decision-making units (DMUs) to be evaluated. Each DMU
consumes varying amounts of m different inputs to produce s different outputs. A decision-
making unit with a score of less than 1 is deemed inefficient relative to other units. An efficient
DMU depicts the efficient frontier that represents achieved efficiency. The mathematical
programming approach to the construction of production frontiers, and the measure of
efficiency relative to the constructed frontiers, is frequently given the descriptive title of data
envelopment analysis.
e e_ _c cr rs s Ð This measure of efficiency is defined under constant returns to scale assumption (CRST).
e e_ _n ni ir rs s Ð This measure of efficiency is defined under non-increasing returns to scale
assumption (NIRST).
e e_ _s s Ð This measure of efficiency is defined as result of dividing: e_crs/e_vrs. This is scale efficiency.
e e_ _v vr rs s Ð This measure of efficiency is defined under variable returns to scale assumption (VRST).
M Ma al lm mq qu ui is st t   p pr ro od du uc ct ti iv vi it ty y   i in nd de ex x Ð This index is defined as the geometric mean of a pair of
ratios of output distance functions. The first ratio compares the performers of data from
periods t and t+1 relative to production possibilities existing in period t, and the second
compares the performance of the same data relative to production possibilities existing in
period t+1. This index is divided into two components: technical efficiency change (E),
technological change (TC). That is, an increase in productivity from one year to the next may
be due to improved technical efficiency (E), technological progress (TC), or a combination of
both (M).
N NI IR RT TS S   m mo od de el l Ð In order to identify types of return to scale effects, the NIRTS DEA model is
used. This model identifies in which region the entity is functioning: increasing, decreasing or
constant returns to scale.
P Pa an nz za ar r   a an nd d   R Ro os ss se e   m mo od de el l   (PR) Ð Ð   Panzar and Rosse (1987) formulated simple a non-structural
model in order to identify the nature of the market structure: oligopoly or monopoly, monopolistic
competition or perfect competition. Panzar and Rosse define a measure of competition H H as the
sum of the elasticity of the reduced-form revenues with respect to the firmÕs input prices:
where: R*
i Ð revenue function in the equilibrium,
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S Sc ca al le e   e ef ff fi ic ci ie en nc cy y   Ð Scale efficiency is defined relative to the form of the locus of technically
efficient production plans.
T Te ec ch hn ni ic ca al l   e ef ff fi ic ci ie en nc cy y Ð Technical efficiency is related to the production of outputs given some
inputs: a production plan is technically efficient if there is no way to produce the same output(s)
with less input(s) or to produce more output(s) with the same input(s). Technical efficiency
considers scale and scope economies.7
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